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Less than We Might: Meditations on Life in Prison 
Without Parole 
Today, death penalty opponents-<:alling themselves abo-
litionists-often claim life without parole (LWOP) as their 
genuinely popular substitute punishment for "the worst of 
the worst." These abolitionists embrace LWOP as cheaper, 
equally just, and equally effective-a punishment that 
eliminates the state's exercise of an inhumane power to 
kill helpless human beings who pose no immediate threat. 
Furthermore, they insist, LWOP allows the criminal jus-
tice system to reverse sentencing mistakes. 
So far in the United States, states that abolish capital 
punishment substitute LWOP, whereas death-penalty 
states offer LWOP as a supplement-the second-worst pun-
ishment for death-eligible killers who plead guilty, or 
whom a jury decides to spare. 
Thousands of hours in several states, interviewing and 
observing more than a hundred convicted killers, along 
with dozens of correctional officers who confine them-
from wardens down to line officers-have taught me that 
LWOP does not substitute for, and suggest that LWOP 
should not supplement, the death penalty. In those states 
that reject the death penalty, LWOP may seem the only 
appropriate punishment for the worst crimes and crimi-
nals. And yet, although conflicted and unsure, on balance 
I believe and will argue here that as presently conceived 
and practiced, life without parole-more and more the 
punishment against which all else is measured-ultimately 
has no place in any criminal justice system worth its name. 
The current climate regarding punishment, reflected 
in the mission statements and professional practices of 
Departments of Corrections, contributes to the failure of 
LWOP as substitute or supplement to death. A different 
concept and practice of punishment-<:all it permanent 
punitive segregation (PPS)-could supply a morally accept-
able substitute to many retributive death penalty supporters 
while satisfying those abolitionists who recognize that the 
worst of the worst of the worst do deserve to be punished 
severely-and forever. Under the banner of PPS-the new 
life without parole-abolitionists who know that evil exists 
and that some vicious people may deserve to die, but who 
can never trust the government to kill its own citizens, 
could unite with reluctant death penalty advocates, haunted 
by sentencing mistakes or racial discrimination, who seek 
a real, deservedly harsh permanent punishment short of 
death that happens to deter more effectively and no more 
expensively than today's life in prison. 
Before imagining a better world, let's see why and how, 
as presently conceived and practiced, LWOP-an indistinct 
and disproportional collective response-not only fails as 
retribution for the most terrible crimes but also fails to act 
as a superior deterrent to life with parole. Let's see why 
LWOP succeeds, if at all, only rhetorically with death pen-
alty opponents who claim to support it while they secretly 
detest it. 
I. Retribution 
Retribution literally means payback. Often in disrepute 
among jurists and other educated elites, retribution persists, 
and today again has become the primary justification for 
punishment. I am a retributivist. We retributivists believe 
in rewarding goodness and punishing sadistic or callous 
cruelty. Naturally grateful, we reward those who bring us 
pleasure. Instinctively resentful, we punish those who 
cause us pain. We believe in payback. 
Retributively, society intentionally inflicts pain and 
suffering on criminals because and only to the extent they 
deserve it. Thus, retribution acts to limit punishment as 
much to justify it. Critics wrongly equate retribution with 
revenge. They disparage retributive punishment's essen-
tial measure-like for like-as barbaric. Retribution, like 
revenge, motivates punishment. But retribution also lim-
its it. The Biblical "eye for an eye," originally understood 
as literally no more than an eye for an eye, exemplifies ret-
ribution as a restriction as much as a justification of 
punishment. Revenge needs no limit: We may wreak 
revenge on a whole community for the acts of a single 
member. But that revenge would be unjust. Thus, it could 
not be retribution. 
Never fully comfortable acknowledging its own retribu-
tive thinking, over the past few decades the United States 
Supreme Court has struck down the death penalty as dis-
proportionally severe for juvenile killers, mentally retarded 
killers, and all rapists whose victims live. These criminals 
could not deserve to die. 
Until May 2010, the Court had not explicitly employed 
retribution to limit a state's right to imprison. That 
changed with Graham v. Florida, in which the majority 
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acknowledged retribution as "a legitimate reason to 
punish."1 Retribution's "heart," the majority observed, 
connects punishment with the "personal culpability of the 
criminal offender."2 But "retribution does not justify 
imposing the second most severe penalty [LWOP] on the 
less culpable juvenile nonhomicide offender. "l 
Retributivists disagree among themselves about who 
deserves what-and why. Kantian retributivists would 
count only the actor's culpable mental state. The attempted 
murderer deserves no less punishment because his aim 
was untrue, or an attending surgeon skillfully removed the 
near-fatal bullet fired point-blank into the victim's head. 
Most retributivists, however, also factor in the actual harm 
willingly caused. Accordingly, all other things equal, murder 
becomes worse than attempted murder, and thus deserves 
greater punishment. 
The majority in Graham seemingly embraced this idea, 
eliminating LWOP for all juveniles who failed to kill their 
victims. "What about Milagro Cunningham," demanded 
the Chief Justice concurring in Graham's result only-this 
"17-year-old who beat and raped an 8-year-old girl before 
leaving her to die under 197 pounds of rock in a recycling 
bin in a remote landfill?"4 His depraved, vicious, callous 
attitude coupled with his depraved, vicious, callous actions 
qualified him at least for the so-called second harshest pun-
ishment. Yet, illogically, the majority would have invoked 
retribution as a categorical limit because Cunningham him-
self was 17 and his 8-year-old victim miraculously lived. 
What about 16-year-old Keighton Budder, the dissent 
in Graham protested? Budder "viciously attacked a 17-year-
old girl who gave him a ride home from a party, put the 
girl's head into a headlock and sliced her throat, raped her, 
stabbed her about 20 times, beat her, and pounded her 
face into the rocks alongside a dirt road. "s Again, because 
the victim miraculously lived, the majority held in Gra-
ham, somehow retribution could not justify LWOP. No 
matter that LWOP might incapacitate these dangerous 
predators more certainly than a life with possibility of 
parole. No matter that it might more effectively deter oth-
ers. If that sentence was not deserved, it could not be 
constitutionally imposed. 
Furthermore, as Justice Thomas, joined by Justices 
Scalia and Alito, pointed out, dissenting in Graham, the 
majority's holding-its "independent judgment" that life 
without parole was "disproportional" for a juvenile whose 
victim lived-"centers on retribution-the notion that a 
criminal sentence should be proportioned to 'the personal 
culpability of the criminal offender.'"6 And although 
retributivists split on how to count the actual harm the 
victim suffers relative to the vicious attitude of the attacker, 
all true retributivists oppose greatly disproportional 
punishment. 
II. Proportionality 
"Let the punishment fit the crime": People have mouthed 
this philosophy for millennia, and seemingly still believe 
it. Originally, like for like, an eye for an eye. exact one-to-one 
reciprocity supplied the simplest and most obvious mea-
sure of proportionality. But, early on, Western society 
adopted less literally reciprocal measures: "If the guilty 
man deserves to be beaten," Deuteronomy declares, "the 
judge shall cause him to lie down and be beaten with a 
number of stripes in proportion to his offense"7 or, in 
another translation, "according to the measure of his 
wickedness."8 In 1215, the Magna Carta continued human-
kind's commitment to proportional punishment: "A free 
man shall be amerced for a small fault only according to 
the measure thereof, and for a great crime according to its 
magnitude." 
Although several early state constitutions specifically 
included proportionality principles-" All penalties ought 
to be proportioned to the nature of the offence," declared 
New Hampshire's in 1784 (emphasis added)-the United 
States Constitution nowhere explicitly commands propor-
tional punishment. Instead, the Eighth Amendment seems 
to imply proportionality by adopting the language of the 
English Bill of Rights (1689) prohibiting "excessive bail," 
"excessive fines," and "Cruel and Unusual Punishment." 
The European Enlightenment embraced liberty and 
rationality. Instead of beating a person in proportion to 
the offense, the new punitive proportionality consisted in 
depriving the criminal of units of freedom. The infant 
American Republic endorsed this new rational proportion-
ality by building penitentiaries and substituting prison time 
for bodily punishment. The measure of punishment, how-
ever, extends beyond the quantity of time in prison. The 
reality of each prisoner's punishment consists in the experience 
of that punishment-a fact that so many have lost sight of 
In 1892, declaring that the Eighth Amendment was 
"directed" "against all punishments which by their excessive 
length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses 
charged," Justice Field, dissenting, would have prohibited 
Vermont from sentencing a seller of unlicensed liquor to 
fifty-four years at hard labor.9 Such a harsh punishment, 
"greatly disproportioned to the offense" and "appropriate 
only for felonies of an atrocious nature," constituted "cruel 
and unusual punishment. "10 
O'Neil's dissenting Justice was, for a while, alone in 
requiring proportional prison terms by combining inten-
sity and duration. In 1910, however, in Weems, a United 
States Supreme Court majority struck down as dispropor-
tionally cruel a fifteen-year sentence at hard labor in chains 
for falsifying a public document, more because of its 
severity than its length. Weems stood alone until 1983. 
Without mentioning retribution, which had fallen out of 
favor, but repeatedly invoking "the longstanding principle 
that punishment should not be, by reason of its excessive 
length or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense 
charged,"n in Solem v. Helm, the Court struck down a life-
without-parole sentence for the defendant's seventh 
nonviolent felony, the crime of passing a worthless check. 
Thus, constitutionally, either death, or LWOP as its substi-
tute, must not be grossly disproportionate to the crime and 
to the criminal's particular culpability, however measured. 
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But Weems and Solem v. Helm were the exceptions. 
Until this year in Graham, aside from capital punishment, 
the Court has almost always left it to state legislatures to 
decide which sentence was proportional to which crime. 
"The Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality 
guarantee," insisted Justice Scalia, joined by ChiefJustice 
Rehnquist in Harmelin, affirming Michigan's right to 
mandate life without parole for simple possession of a lit-
tle more than a pound of cocaine while casting serious 
doubt on the constitutional status of proportionality 
between crime and punishment: "There is no objective 
standard of gravity. "12 These two Justices saw proportion-
ality as a pretext for members of the Court imposing their 
own subjective values. 
"Courts have not baldly substituted their own subjec-
tive moral values for those of the legislature," countered 
Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, 
dissenting in Harmelin. 13 Michigan, with no death penalty, 
could not constitutionally reserve the same punishment 
for drug possession as it had for first degree murder. 
"The Eighth Amendment does not require strict pro-
portionality between crime and sentence," declared Justice 
Kennedy, joined by O'Connor and Souter, upholding 
Harmelin's life without parole sentence but occupying the 
current constitutional middle ground. 14 "Rather, it forbids 
only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to 
the crime. "1> In Ewing (2003), the Supreme Court again 
split into three factions, a majority (5-4) affuming as not 
disproportionately long California's popular three-strikes-
and-you're-out life sentence for a career criminal whose 
latest crime was shoplifting three golf clubs. 16 
Except for the death penalty, public officials and com-
mentators have avoided supporting intense punishment. 
Thus, states have traditionally defined and distinguished 
greater and lesser crimes by letter (A, B, C, D, E felonies) 
or number (first degree, second degree, third degree, 
etc.); then matched to each category maximum sentences 
described as prison time (life, twenty-five years, fifteen 
years, etc.); and finally designated prisons as maximum, 
medium, or minimum security. Such designations sup-
posedly correlate the fature dangerousness and escape 
risk of the prisoners with the degree their freedom will 
be restricted inside-as if the worse the crime and the 
longer the sentence, the higher the security level and the 
more punitive the experience. By dividing prisons into 
security levels, however, the public has emphasized its 
own safety rather than the punishment or desert of the 
person punished. 
In sum, the modem emphasis on quantifiable and 
rational proportionality largely has obscured the second 
dimension of punishment-not only duration but also 
intensity. Not only how long, but how long. Retributively, 
how can state legislatures impose the same intensity of 
punishment for persistent petit theft or drug possession 
as for aggravated murder without violating basic standards 
of disproportionality? Retributively, how can states subject 
aggravated murderers and perennial thieves to the same 
prison conditions? How does a Supreme Court tolerate this 
state of affairs and hold it constitutionally permissible? Only 
by ignoring retribution as an objective limit on punishment 
and tolerating all but the grossest disproportionality. 
Ill. LWOP: A Binding Covenant with the Past 
Although retributivists disagree among themselves on 
how to weigh the actual harm produced by the most cal-
lous and cruel, all retributivists ultimately subordinate the 
future costs or benefits of punishment, resting justice-
limited, proportional punishment-exclusively on a 
criminal's past moral culpability. Thus, retributivists reject 
Hobbes's classic utilitarian claim that "the aym of Punish-
ment is not a revenge but terrour. "17 Retributivists dismiss 
contemporary utilitarians who declare it irrational to cry 
over spilt blood; they rebut the humane argument that cer-
tain punishments are pointless-"What good will it do to 
inflict more pain?" utilitarians ask-as itself beside the 
point. Justice, a moral imperative in itself, requires 
deserved punishment. 
The past counts. 
Many death penalty abolitionists who claim to support 
LWOP fail to grasp fully LWOP's retributive core. Condemn-
ing us death penalty supporters for our retributivism-our 
irrational commitment to the past-abolitionists shame-
lessly promote LWOP as the better option. But on what 
basis? If a concern with public safety dominates individual 
justice, surely in some extreme cases where a LWOPer has 
become physically or mentally disabled, now suffering from 
an incurable illness that renders him harmless, we as a ratio-
nal society should be prepared to release him, now that he 
no longer poses any threat. 
Or, suppose that forty years after his imprisonment, 
this convicted killer demonstrates beyond doubt that he 
has thoroughly transformed himself. Now genuinely 
remorseful for his despicable murders, he has long since 
embraced and maintained a humane value system, helping 
others, educating himself. Rationally, as forward-looking, 
compassionate people, we should be prepared to forgive 
and forget. We should allow him to experience his later 
life, free in a society whose values he now cherishes. 
I have visited with these murderers, sometimes 
decades after their vicious deeds; too often, hearing their 
gentle sighs and genuine regrets, I, too, cannot help but 
wonder "What is the point of punishing these lifers until 
death?" And yet. ... 
With LWOP, we continue to imprison him until he 
dies. Like Odysseus at the mast, who made his men swear 
that they would ignore his future pleas and keep the cove-
nant, when we sentence to LWOP, we irrevocably pledge 
at this moment forever: We will never let our rage and dis-
gust disintegrate and deteriorate. LWOP creates a binding 
commitment now and forever never to think differently, 
or feel different-when the future becomes the present 
and the present is now past. We guard against our own 
future passion, not of the rage and disgust that presently 
move us, but against the rationally anticipated decay of 
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anger and the sense of forgiveness or mercy that will 
replace it someday when we would focus exclusively on the 
living criminal and forget the victim of the past. We deter-
mine never to question how it can serve human dignity to 
continue to cage a changed, nonthreatening, harmless 
person who seems genuinely to regret his mistakes. 
In short, if we mean what we declare by LWOP, we can 
do so only because we have made a covenant with that 
past-that we shall never forget nor forgive; neither review 
nor revise-a covenant that we bind ourselves to keep. 
Thus, we reject the problematic question "What good will 
it do?" and instead continue to focus on the bad that has 
been done. 
IV. "It's Not My Job to Punish": Why LWOP Fails 
Retributively 
When I began my prison travels, I believed that correc-
tions officers saw their mission as ensuring that more or 
less serious crimes would receive more or less serious 
punishments. This thinking seemed almost too obvious 
to discuss, much less dispute. However imprecisely 
administered, in theory at least, the punishment would be 
proportionate to the crime. The public mostly believes 
this scenario, and I did, too. 
The first jolt came from David Roach, warden of Lorton 
Central Prison, the flagship ofWashington D.C.'s prison 
system. Wandering the 68-acre compound, astounded at the 
freedom and laid-back lifestyle of convicted killers, I pro-
tested to the Warden at one of our first interviews. "These 
guys have done bad things; they deserve to be punished." 
"The punishment should not be re-punishment," 
Roach replied. "The punishment is given in the court-
room. When the judge says 'You have been found guilty; 
you are sentenced to thus and so,' that's the punishment. 
The judge did not send them here, in my opinion, for me 
or anyone else to punish them." 
That statement astounded me. Here was the warden 
telling me, a criminal law professor, that a convicted 
killer had already been fully punished by his sentence, 
before he even began his life in prison. Nobody's job 
here inside was to further punish him. Corrections 
should create an environment conducive to rehabilita-
tion, the Warden had explained. On entering the system, 
he said, each "resident" -a "ward of the court" -should 
be thoroughly tested, and professional counselors should 
fashion for each individual a "treatment prescription. 
Each resident must attain realistic goals that he sets for 
himself" The "stafP' inside Lorton Central was "paid to 
supervise" that process, he added. "I don't believe that 
the officers are merely guards. And I don't think the 
inmates are merely prisoners," Roach explained. This 
social services speak really jarred me, because I was com-
ing to grips firsthand with some very vicious killers 
sentenced to life inside Lorton. 
When I first encountered him, I suspected Warden 
Roach was a strange anomaly with a paternalistic, per-
missive attitude, at odds with his staff who had to deal 
with these criminals out on the compound. Yet even 
old-time supposedly tough officers such as Frank Town-
shend, the night shift captain at Lorton, were drinking 
the Kool-Aid. Was the Captain concerned with the seri-
ousness of a prisoner's crime in administering his 
punishment? "It's none of my business," Townshend 
insisted. "What a man is like in here is what I'm con-
cerned with. Not what he did out there." And so it was 
from top to bottom. 
In administering punishment, if the staff consciously 
ignores or remains ignorant of the prisoner's crime, how 
can L WOP be expected to substitute for the death penalty 
as a morally adequate, proportional punishment? When I 
first heard officers articulate these statements, I dismissed 
them as wildly eccentric. After all, Lorton was the only all-
Black prison system in the United States and had no racial 
conflicts nor serious gang disputes, plus many Lorton offi-
cials came up from the same streets as the inmates whose 
lives they regulated. In two decades of prison research, 
however, I've found the attitude of Lorton staff nearly uni-
versal among corrections officials. 
"Our job is just to follow the law," explained Cameron 
Harvanik, Oklahoma State Penitentiary's good-natured 
deputy warden, caught in jeans and a baseball cap, a video 
camera thrust unexpectedly at him one Sunday afternoon. 
"I mean, the judge says that this man's got the death sen-
tence, or the judge says this guy's doing life without," 
Harvanik continued. "Our job is to make sure he does it. 
Our job is not to punish." 
'These guys have committed the most heinous crimes," 
I protested. "Killed and raped and murdered children. ls 
there ever some part of you that says, These guys aren't 
getting what they deserve?'" 
"To be honest with you, no. I never really think about 
it," Harvanik responded. 
"So you're not angry?" 
"No, I'm not angry." 
"No matter what a guy did?" 
"When I come to work every day, I flip the switch: 
These people are human beings; it don't matter what 
their crime is, they're still people. They deserve fair treat-
ment, they deserve a quality oflife while they're in here. 
Their punishment is doing the time."' 
"It's not our job to punish people," concurred Layne 
Davidson, who had worked nearly every unit of Oklahoma 
State Penitentiary at the time I interviewed him. "Our job is 
to house them-the punishment comes when he misbe-
haves while inside. Being here in itself is not a punishment; 
it's what the courts say we should do. I don't see this as a 
punishment. I'm not here-and neither is my staff-to 
judge what's right and wrong. We're here to do and carry 
out what the courts have set forth." 
"Nothing you did in the past matters," I protested. 
"Not true," he corrected me. "Assault on staff with an 
injury, you're not beyond level two for the rest of your life. 
If you escape from max, if you get convicted of killing 
another inmate, you'll never go beyond level two." 
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So the past could count. But for those who administer 
the prisons, life begins when life begins-from day one, 
inside. 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault had seen the great 
transformation in punishment from the direct application 
of unpleasant sensations on the prisoner's body to "an 
economy of suspended rights."18 The next step beyond 
Foucault-the threat to withdraw privileges-more nearly 
describes the experience of punishment for LWOPers 
today. "They earn any privileges based on their behavior," 
Davidson continued. "If you don't have privileges, if you 
don't have anything to offer them, you cannot control 
them short of physical control. I tell you, in here the pen is 
mightier than any sword. An inmate would rather me 
come in that cell with a riot baton and beat on him for 
punishment than write a report for an infraction, because 
of privileges he's gonna lose." 
"I wouldn't call it justice to justify what we do to get 
them to cooperate," admitted Sgt. Hugh Rushton, officer 
in charge of security inside Unit 2 of Tennessee's River· 
bend Maximum Security Institution. It puts our staff 
safer. My job is safety, security. My job is not to punish." 
"Let me ask Sgt. Rushton, citizen. If you weren't 
involved, would you feel that justice is being done?" 
"No sir. As citizen Rushton, it's not justice at all-it's 
not fair to the families of the victims. As citizen Rushton, 
he's supposed to suffer. Ifl were on the street, I'd demand 
he suffer. But I'm here to protect them." 
"The past doesn't count?" 
"It counts but you can't let it interfere with what you're 
doing." 
"Sounds like the past counts but you can't count it." 
"Ifl did, I wouldn't be a professional." 
For Sgt. Rushton and most of his colleagues, I've dis· 
covered, professional means devoid of personal anger. The 
corrections officer imbibes a credo that it is unprofes-
sional to count the past, to connect crime to punishment: 
"We don't discriminate; we treat everyone the same." 
Equal protection, of course, is vital and basic to a humane 
rule oflaw. Rightly, the criminal justice system rejects and 
prevents sadistic or racist armed officers from arbitrarily 
making captives' lives miserable. When officers of the 
state inflict pain on grounds other than desert, when they 
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or identity, they 
not only violate equal protection but also undermine retri· 
bution. Retributive justice itself requires that the quality of 
life inside match-be proportioned to-the nature of the 
crime: Let the punishment fit the crime. 
On death row, officers rationalize their day-to-day no· 
punishment credo by noting the ultimate punishment that 
awaits condemned killers in the execution chamber. With 
LWOPers who have escaped the death penalty or had their 
sentences overturned and been released from death row 
into the general prison population, however, officers could 
not rationalize punishment by locating it elsewhere, at least 
not inside the prison. ''I'm a religious man," explained 
Layne Davidson. "I believe the ultimate punishment will 
come at the end of all of our lives. I don't believe it's any-
. body's job to make their life miserable until that time." 
But the United States is a constitutional republic based 
on a separation of church and state. Our Constitution 
demands the pursuit of justice-in this world, by us. 
"My personal opinion--certain crimes, the person 
should be made to pay every day." At last, a retributivist, 
I thought, listening to Steve Beck, the warden of String· 
town. "But I'm not here to punish," he added. Steve Beck 
presided over the least restrictive institution in Oklahoma 
where a capital murderer who has been spared the death 
penalty could spend the rest of his life. 
"A guy commits aggravated murder-rapes, tortures, 
and kills-and then gets to play softball. ls that right?" I 
demanded. 
"My professional opinion is, whatever I'm tasked to do 
by my superiors in the state of Oklahoma, I'll do. If my 
task is to tie them to a pole and horsewhip them every 
Monday morning, they'll be horsewhipped every Monday 
morning. But that's not what I'm tasked to do." 
The mission statements of every Department of Cor· 
rections supported the warden's claim: Not one mentions 
punishment. "A lot of these people," Beck continued, "I 
know what they're in here for. I have to treat them all as if 
they're here for the same thing." 
"But people who have murdered children have the 
option to play softball?" 
"As long as they meet the criteria, they can play softball." 
"Can you understand why I would be appalled at that?" 
"I can understand how the parents of that child would 
be appalled at that." 
"You never walk by the field, see them playing softball, 
and growl to yourself, 'This is wrong. I'm in charge of it 
and it's wrong?"' 
"I've conditioned myself not to." 
"You're willing to sacrifice justice." 
"We're not sacrificing justice because we're not defin· 
ing it." 
"You're administering it. Or not," I shot back. 
"We're administering the sentences given by the 
courts." 
''The courts only give them a number. You could have 
them walking in circles, you could have them dig holes 
and fill them up again. That would be exercise. It would be 
very punitive exercise because it would be purposeless, 
and not designed to give them pleasure. Whereas softball 
is designed to give them pleasure." 
"At the s.h.u. [segregated housing unit], they walk 
around in a circle in a cage. That's all they get to do. Is that 
what you want everybody to do? We'll need a lot of cages." 
Sometime later, Warden Beck's own righteous indig· 
nation broke through: "This guy goes and kills a man and 
his wife and drags them out in the field and sets them on 
fire. Go hang him from a tree." 
"You can't hang him from a tree," I protested. "The 
courts won't let you." 
"Exactly!" 
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"But don't let him play softball and eat ice cream." 
"What am I going to do with him?" 
"Make life as unpleasant as you can, legally. Even if 
your staff becomes slightly more endangered, and the 
inmates become slightly less controllable. Pay a price, to 
do justice. Because if you're not, nobody's going to do it. 
You're the executive. Execute punishment." 
Warden Beck seemed to enjoy my retributive attack 
on his professional persona: "As Steve Beck, I'm encour-
aging you. As the Warden, I'm unconcerned. As Steve 
Beck, if I had my way, we'd have a lot of ropes hanging 
on trees. As the Warden, I'll have them climb the ropes 
for exercise." 
Perhaps Lee Mann, warden's assistant at the Oklahoma 
State Penitentiary summed up best the indiscriminate 
immorality oflife in prison: "We want to make the time 
for them as easy as we can, because it makes it easy for us 
if it's easy for them." 
V. Abolitionist Rhetoric: "Death By Incarceration" 
"A better name for this sentence [LWOP] might be 'Death 
by incarceration,'" declared Professor Robert Johnson,19 
trying to heighten the hyperbole of those who use artful 
but misleading rhetoric to support the substitution oflife 
without parole for the death penalty. True, almost all 
aggravated murderers sentenced to LWOP will die in 
prison. But almost none will die because of prison. We all 
live, condemned to die, somehow, somewhere. Some of us 
will die in old age in our sleep, or watching television, or 
taking a bath. Should we call these closing scenes "death 
by sleep." "death by television," "death by bathing?" Or is it 
simply about where we die? "Death by home, death by hos-
pital, death by bowling alley. Death by incarceration." The 
rhetoric obscures the reality. 
The question of justice-whether LWOP can morally 
substitute for the death penalty--depends not on where 
these vicious killers die, but on how they live before they die. 
If the tortured victim could somehow watch what hap-
pens to her rapist-murderer, spending his life in prison 
without parole, would she feel satisfied that justice was 
being done? Read the testimony of abolitionists, and you'd 
conjure up perpetual misery in dungeons where the L WO-
Pers never see the light of day. But then why does the 
prison commissary sell lifers suntan lotion with an SPF 
factor of thirty? 
"Here in the valley, suddenly yesterday, dark heavy 
clouds rolled in,'' recounted Sarah Mitchell to a friend and 
fellow murderer.2° "That lightening put on quite a show!" 
After killing, dismembering, and lighting her sister on 
fire, Ms. Mitchell planned to impersonate her murdered 
sister and then withdraw money from trust accounts. Con-
victed of that aggravated murder and sentenced to L WOP, 
Mitchell candidly described her daily life in her new digs: 
We are eating Good! Bananas, whole tomatoes, grape-
fruits, oranges, apples, pears-galore. For breakfast 
it alternates between bagels cream cheese with boiled 
eggs, coffee, raisen bran, milk & juice-to two fried 
eggs, 3 link sausages, toast, jelly, oatmeal, coffee-to 
thick-thick French toast (3 slices) syrup, cream of 
wheat & milk, coffee-To Denver omelletes 3 pieces 
of crisp bacon, grits, a piece of fruit, coffee, milk or 
tea, toast etc. 
The dinner menus are like restaurants--enchala-
das, cheeseburgers. Stroganoff, chefs salad, 1/4 
chicken, tater tots, cheesecake, brownies, apple pie, 
cherry cobbler, ambrosia, spaghetti, greens, ice cream 
(cups & drumsticks!) pepsi, cr[eam] soda, grape 
ne[ctar], baked potatoes, fruitbars, burritos, roast beef 
with gravy, pepperoni, raviolis, good fish, sloppy Joes, 
corn dogs. The veggies, desserts & side dishes are 
very good. We get relish packets and real mayon-
naise!!! It just feels so much better eating this "real" 
healthy faire. 
My video camera has recorded L WO Pers playing 
softball-in uniforms, baseball uniforms-on baseball 
fields with chalked base paths, swinging for the fences 
(albeit topped with barbed wire), and rounding the bases 
to the cheers and high-fives of teammates and buddies. 
"Never see the light of day ... a fate worse than death," 
abolitionists argue with straight faces. The U.S. Supreme 
Court rejects this empty rhetoric: "The second most severe 
penalty" the majority in Graham calls LWOP.21 "A life sen-
tence is of course far less severe than a death sentence,'' the 
Chief Justice concurred. 22 
If a state or the federal government abolishes the death 
penalty and substitutes life without parole, the problem of 
proportionality hardly disappears. Would multiple killers 
who rape and torture children receive proportional punish-
ment by spending the rest of their lives in prison, no longer 
under a sentence of death? Would they get what they 
deserve? Any legislature considering abolishing or restoring 
the death penalty must face this question. We retributivists 
detest arbitrary punishment. We disavow disproportionate 
punishment-punishing too much or too little. 
VI. An Alternative to Death and LWOP: Permanent 
Punitive Segregation (PPS) 
For the worst of the worst of the worst, retributively, life 
itself should be a punishment beyond a permanent loss of 
liberty. Life should be painful and unpleasant, every day. 
Perhaps the United States could constitutionally maintain 
a system of justice in which defining and administering a 
life in prison can be morally substituted for the death pen-
alty. What would it feel like? 
Imagine PPS, permanent punitive segregation, reserved 
only for the worst of the worst of the worst-rapist-mur-
derers of children, for example-specially convicted and, 
in a separate penalty phase, specially condemned by a jury 
to suffer this fate. Those condemned to PPS would be 
housed in a separate prison. They would be permanently 
subjected to the harshest conditions the Constitution allows. 
Specifically, their food would be nutraloaf-a tasteless 
patty, nutritious enough not to foreshorten their lives. 
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Visits would be kept to the minimum and none would be 
contact visits, ever. These aggravated murderers would 
never touch another human being again. They would 
labor daily and purposelessly-digging holes to fill them 
up. Other exercise would be Spartan-running in circles. 
They would be provided no radios or TV and, of course, no 
Internet. They would get one brief, lukewarm shower a 
week. Photos of their victims would adorn their cells-in 
their faces, but out of reach, reminding these condemned 
killers daily of their crimes. 
PPS should cost no more to keep society safe. And, 
while satisfying society's need to justly condemn and 
punish, might PPS also act as a more effective deterrent 
than life in prison today? 
A. Deterrence 
Of course the death penalty deters some people. As the 
Royal Commission (1948-1953) observed in its lengthy 
and thoughtful report, "We can number its failures, but 
we cannot number its successes. "23 We can never know 
how many people who would have otherwise committed 
murder stopped themselves only because society threat· 
ened death as punishment. The deterrence question, 
really, is not whether the death penalty deters-sometimes 
it surely does-but whether, on balance, it deters more 
effectively than life without parole. A state that substitutes 
life without parole for death, or life for LWOP, ought to 
ask whether the harsher LWOP deters more effectively 
than ordinarily life. 
Abolitionists produce statistical studies to show that 
the death penalty does not act as a deterrent superior to 
L WOP. Death penalty advocates counter with other equally 
sophisticated studies showing execution's superior deter· 
rent effect. 
Human nature and common sense, however, buttress 
the claim that LWOP fails to deter as effectively as death. 
"No other punishment deters men so effectually from com-
mitting crimes as the punishment of death," proclaimed 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, the great nineteenth-century 
English judge and a leading historian of criminal law. 24 
This is one of those propositions which it is difficult 
to prove, simply because they are in themselves more 
obvious than any proof can make them. It is possible 
to display ingenuity in arguing against it, but that is 
all. The whole experience of mankind is in the other 
direction .... "All that a man has will he give for his 
life." In any secondary punishment, however terrible, 
there is hope: But death is death. 2 5 
LWOP offers no hope ofrelease, abolitionists counter; 
that's its strength. 
True, but long mandatory minimum sentences such as 
seventy to life for drug crimes and repeating offenders, 
where the prisoner must serve the front number before 
becoming eligible for parole, blurs if it does not obliterate 
all distinction between life with and without the possibility 
of parole. A society determined to maximize the deterrent 
power oflife without parole would rarely impose it and 
clearly separate it from life with possible parole. 
life without parole may effectively deter would-be 
criminals by threatening no real prospect of release from 
prison short of death. LWOP as currently practiced, how-
ever, softens the threat by offering life's pleasures and 
releases day to day, inside. 
While robbing a middle-level cocaine dealer in Vir-
ginia, "Joe" and his partners discovered their robbery 
victims also possessed kilos of heroin. With his victims 
tied up and duct-taped, Joe decided to kill them, he 
recalled. But at the last moment he changed his mind. 
Why had he let them live? "When I was doing time in 
Richmond, I used to see the electric chair when I swept 
the hall. And what flashed in my mind was that chair, 
and I didn't want that. I couldn't handle that. So I let 
them live." 
This anecdote shows only how the death penalty 
deterred this one killer at this one moment. It does not 
demonstrate the more important point that sometimes 
only the death penalty can deter, whereas the prospect of 
life in prison will not. But Joe continued, telling me of a 
similar situation in Washington, D.C., which has no death 
penalty. "I killed them," he explained matter-of-factly. 
"Because I could face life inside this joint. I had done time 
here before, and I knew I could do it again. But that chair, 
man. That's something else." 
Common sense, human nature, logic, and anecdote 
strongly support what many recent studies suggest-death 
generally deters more effectively than life without parole. 
Common sense, human nature, and logic suggest that an 
especially harsh, permanently hopeless life inside prison, 
PPS, could more effectively deter than LWOP does now-
and perhaps deter as effectively, or more effectively, than 
the death penalty itself. 
For killers like Joe, only a life inside qualitatively 
worse-a life that he could not have experienced before 
and might only imagine-could possibly act as a mar-
ginally greater deterrent. No one sentenced to PPS will 
have served it before-no one will know s/he can do it 
again. When measured against all other life imprison-
ment, PPS will truly be something different. Although 
no anecdote yet supports this untried punishment, 
analogy supports its deterrence claim. Officers and pris· 
oners agree that, inside prison, the threat of punitive 
segregation generally deters lifers from acting up. So, 
too, PPS can easily be imagined as deterring would-be 
repeating killers and other serious street criminals from 
aggravated murder, because and only because they 
face PPS. 
If a state abolishes the death penalty, and rape or 
robbery gets a repeat offender natural life, what's the 
incentive to leave your victim as a living witness against 
you? A prospect of PPS supplies that deterrent against 
killing the victim, because it would be reserved only for 
the most heinous murderers and attempted murderers. 
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B. Emotional Cost of Not Doing Justice 
Today, in death penalty states, first degree murderers 
often plead guilty and accept life without parole. Each 
guilty plea saves U.S. citizens hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, and the victims' families decades of cruel sus-
pense and false assurances. 
Some abolitionists, such as Reverend Cathy Harrington, 
whose daughter was stabbed to death, successfully sought 
to avoid these additional emotional costs by convincing the 
prosecutors to accept LWOP in lieu of death. Championing 
abolitionism, Rev. Harrington has gone public with her 
story, urging LWOP as far better for the victims' families. 
But only the threat of death as punishment produced this 
preferred outcome. Her daughter's killer would never have 
pied guilty without that quid pro quo. 
Substitute LWOP for the death penalty, and this incen-
tive disappears. Substitute PPS for the death penalty, and 
the incentive to plead guilty and accept ordinary life with 
or without parole to avoid PPS reappears. The duration of 
punishment won't do it; the intensity will. 
Today, abolishing the death penalty-retributively, 
sometimes the only proportional punishment-abolishes 
justice. Cathy Harrington imagined her daughter's killer 
suffering until the day he died as a lifer, and worried that 
she had consigned him to a fate worse than death. Little 
did she realize that he would ask to be put into the special 
needs unit, which freed him from gang violence, assured 
him of four hours of recreation a day, and allowed him to 
watch the Winter Olympics and play cards with his fellow 
inmates. 
With the death penalty's drawn-out cycle of appeals, 
the victim's family becomes embittered. Their frustration 
grows from the false promise of justice held by a death 
penalty regime that delays and delays the execution of its 
sentence. On the other hand, what cost to parents who 
realize their child's rapist-murderer now lives in prison 
playing basketball, or watching the World Cup on color 
TV? What toll to contemplate the person who tortured 
your child to death now lying on a prison bed, lost in a 
first-run movie or a good book? 
Death penalty opponents traditionally ignore the emo-
tional costs of not doingjustice-a retributive question 
cloaked as a financial one. Their insensitivity increases 
with LWOP as presently administered. The victim's family's 
bitterness and frustration intensifies from the false promise 
of justice. The current system will never deliver on that 
promise. 
If the U.S. criminal justice system embraces perma-
nent punitive segregation-where life itself constitutes 
punishment-the victim's family will realize that the killer 
never experiences anything they would have wished for 
their loved one. No participating or watching sporting 
events. No pleasure of good food. No joys of human 
contact-no hugs or kisses, ever. 
Some readers may protest. Genetic predispositions 
and early childhood abuse or neglect have formed and 
deformed these criminals, they insist. Why should 
anybody be subjected to sustained, inhumane, pointless 
cruelty, for behavior or a personality they did not freely 
choose? But the argument proves too much. If a rapist 
child killer does not deserve at least PPS, why should 
anybody-always subject to influence beyond their 
control-ever be punished (or rewarded) for anything? 
C. Incapacitation 
LWOP proponents claim their preferred sentence equals 
the death penalty in its incapacitative effect. Death penalty 
advocates point out, however, that a future governor may 
later commute any LWOP sentence. A legislature may 
decide to follow Europe's lead and abolish life without 
parole. Once released, a killer may kill again, whereas, of 
course, an aggravated murderer, once executed, will never 
kill again. And even while incarcerated, an LWOPer may 
kill fellow prisoners, staff, or visitors. Of course, so, too, 
may a condemned killer on death row, although officers 
and the condemned routinely tell me that the level of vio-
lence is much lower on death row than in the general 
prison population. 
Ultimately, however, these arguments are beside the 
point. Prison life could be designed and administered so 
that convicted killers cannot kill again. Overall, the death 
penalty cannot be humanely chosen over LWOP on the 
basis of incapacitation alone. Besides, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that to pass constitutional mus-
ter, the death penalty must serve as deterrence or 
retribution. 
Adopting PPS as a harsher supplement to LWOP 
strips its critics of the plausible but specious argument 
that LWOPers have nothing to lose in prison-that with-
out hope of parole, they will kill again at will, knowing 
nothing more can be done to them. My research confums 
what the scant literature on this topic reflects: Lifers have 
the most to lose and are often the best behaved inside. 
Often they have the best jobs and the easiest lifestyles, 
earned over years. Although retributively unjust, these 
incentives to avoid transfer or punitive segregation keep 
lifers well behaved. 
With the threat of PPS readily apparent to prisoners and 
public alike, no one would claim that only the death penalty 
could keep a lifer in check. And with PPS, the absence of 
human contact would ensure that those confined to perpet-
ual punitive segregation could not kill again. 
D. Mistake 
Abolitionists often urge the substitution ofLWOP for the 
death penalty, arguing that mistakes are inevitable and 
death is irreversible. Innocent people have certainly been 
condemned to death. Most probably one, or more, has 
been executed in the modem era-although the abolition· 
ists cannot yet prove that. 
Utilitarian supporters of the death penalty have coun-
tered that innocent victims of condemned killers released 
from death row into the general population or free society 
who kill again should offset innocents the state may execute. 
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On balance, these utilitarian death penalty supporters 
argue, life-life tradeoffs suggest that with its greater deter-
rent force, even counting mistakes, the death penalty will 
save more innocent lives than will life without parole.26 
The death penalty much more sharply focuses our 
attention on our own mistakes. The thought of executing 
an innocent person sobers us. Expensive lawyers with abo-
litionist convictions offset their $1,000-an-hour billing 
habit with pro-bono capital appellate work. Law-student 
volunteers rush to provide research assistance and support 
to the condemned. Pen pals and groupies clamor to visit. 
But who champions the cause oflifers who claim their 
innocence? 
On balance, although the consequence of a single mis-
take is more tragic with the death penalty, the number of 
mistakes will multiply should LWOP be substituted for 
death as punishment. 
Adopt PPS, and the thought of an innocent person 
exposed to a lifetime of such suffering will make us shud-
der. With PPS, we can expect the same passion and zeal 
pro-bono death penalty opponents bring to their capital 
defendants. Substitute PPS for LWOP, and lifelong mis· 
takes should dramatically decrease. 
E. The Polls: The Public Choice 
"For cases of murder, do you prefer the death penalty or life 
in prison without the chance of parole?" Note the fallacy of 
that standard poll question-how it doubly distorts. 
First, discriminating, informed, retributivist advocates 
reserve the death penalty only for aggravated murder-the 
worst of the worst of the worst. We agree with the United 
States Supreme Court and every death-penalty jurisdiction 
in the United States that the vast majority of murderers do 
not deserve to die. Do we "prefer" death or life without 
parole "for cases of murder"? Should we retributivist advo· 
cates of capital punishment who oppose the death penalty 
for most cases of murder allow the polls to count us as 
abolitionists? 
Second, consider the last part of the standard question: 
"without the chance of parole" or Gallup's "with absolutely 
no possibility of parole." Abolitionists delight in empha-
sizing that we who sometimes favor death cannot be 
absolutely certain that an innocent person will never be 
executed. Thus, they insist, the penalty should be abol-
ished rather than take an infinitesimal if inescapable risk. 
Yet the very same opponents who would disable us from 
acting on near-certainty blithely assure their fellow citi-
zens that LWOP carries no chance of parole. 
Furthermore, most citizens polled will equate "abso-
lutely no possibility of parole" with "no possibility of 
release." Few people factor in executive clemency. And, 
although a parole board may almost never release a con-
victed mass murderer, even after he has aged and now 
seems gentle and no longer any threat to anyone, a future 
legislature may simply abolish life without parole whole-
sale and apply its new policy retroactively. Europe has 
mostly abolished life without parole, even for genocide and 
crimes against humanity-although you'd be hard pressed 
to discover this fact via leading media news outlets, whose 
abolitionist editorials favor substituting L WOP for death 
while otherwise urging the United States to follow 
Europe's lead. 
The standard poll question further distorts and elevates 
support for LWOP while artificially diminishing support 
for the death penalty by making the aggravated murder 
itself little more than an abstract event. Polls discourage 
respondents from matching a concrete punishment to a 
specific crime. Of course, abolitionist pollsters shy away 
from asking even the abstract question directly: "Do you 
favor the death penalty for the worst murderers-for exam-
ple, a serial killer who rapes and tortures children?" Once 
made aware of the victim's suffering and the killer's 
viciousness, what punishment will the overwhelming 
majority match to torturing and killing children? That 
question (Do you favor the death penalty for the worst 
murderers?-the real question) abolitionist pollsters scru-
pulously avoid. 
Beyond obscuring from the public the nature of the 
crimes that might bring these punishments, the polls 
distort the nearly even split between those who seem to 
prefer L WOP to death by obscuring the nature of the 
punishment itself. The public widely assumes that an 
aggravated murderer serving life without parole feels the 
sting of purushment most severely. The abolitionist media 
aids and abets this public fraud. Thus, abolitionists dis-
missed as "abstract" the support of70 percent of 
Californians for the death penalty in the latest Field Poll, 
pointing out that 42 percent of registered voters said they 
prefer LWOP and 41 percent said they prefer death for 
first degree murderers.27 
Let the public become aware of the actual lifestyle of 
Lifers, or let states substitute PPS for today's LWOP, and 
reveal the real split between those who favor life and those 
who favor death as the ultimate punishment. 
F. Retribution 
Satisfying, popular, and persistent as an idea, retribution 
fundamentally fails in the actual administration of punish-
ment. Every Department of Corrections in the United 
States officially rejects retribution, declaring public safety 
and rehabilitation as its primary mission. Thus, prison 
administration throughout the United States today largely 
severs the connection between crime and punishment on 
which retribution essentially rests. 
As noted previously, corrections officers proclaim that 
"what a man did out there is none of my business. How 
he acts inside determines how he'll be treated here." And 
although the more heinous crimes generally do carry 
longer prison sentences, in fact the most vicious criminals 
serving life sentences for the worst crimes often have the 
best jobs, best hustles, and easiest lifestyles. In short, 
largely unnoted even by retributivists themselves, inside 
prisons, daily life mocks retribution: Those who deserve 
it most suffer least. 
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The adoption of PPS could sustain that connection 
between crime and punishment. Every corrections official 
working in PPS should be required to read a description 
of the crime of every LWOPer punished with PPS. We 
should tolerate no abuse of these prisoners, no beatings or 
sadism on the part of officers guarding them. But no con-
viviality, either. Officers would be instructed to be proper, 
but distant and cold. For PPS, Corrections' mission should 
be punishment. Those most vicious predators punished 
by perpetual punitive segregation would receive no better 
food, housing, or medical care than that offered to innocent 
poor outside. 
As it connects crime and punishment, PPS clearly sep-
arates LWOP from ordinary life sentences. This hopeless, 
bleak experience should be reserved only for the worst of 
the worst of the worst. No "three strikes and you're PPS." 
No "drug kingpin and you're PPS." PPS should never be a 
default sentence, as LWOP has become in states such as 
Florida, which abolished parole. Only if you deserve PPS 
by your cruelty should you receive it. 
PPS should never be inflicted because a person, juvenile 
or adult, is found incorrigible-not subject to change or 
development. The perpetually dangerous must be incapaci-
tated, but PPS should be reserved only for the deserving. 
PPS constitutes a retributive sentence, plain and simple-an 
unbreakable covenant with the past. 
G. Denunciation 
For twenty-five centuries at least. Western culture has 
specially denounced and distinguished the worst killings. 
Yet with a greater variety of crimes. especially narcotics 
offenses carrying ridiculous mandatory minimums, the 
line between life with and without parole has blurred. 
"Three strikes and you're out" compounds the problem. 
In short, those too long and too common sentences 
undercut that special denunciation which ought to attach 
only to the worst criminals. 
Although the majority in Graham subsumed denunci-
ation under retribution,28 denunciation sometimes 
separately justifies a special sentence, even if that sentence 
may never be carried out. States such as New Hampshire, 
which executes nobody, tenaciously cling to the death 
penalty, probably from a need to ritually denounce and 
condemn killers whom the state will never in fact execute. 
In its capital jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly declared that death is different. PPS, too, 
should constitute a separate sentence, clearly distin-
guished from all others, requiring a special penalty trial. 
If PPS were adopted, perhaps then the death penalty 
could be justly abolished, although some of us retributiv-
ists would still insist death sometimes constitutes the 
only just response. In any case, states that have abolished 
the death penalty might adopt PPS, but use it very. very 
sparingly. 
Meanwhile, states that retain the death penalty should 
reconfigure their death rows to replicate the conditions of 
PPS. 
H. Conclusion: The Moral Illogic of LWOP 
Without PPS 
But we don't have PPS. We have supermaxes that keep 
prisoners safely confined. largely in isolation, and we have 
temporary punitive segregation units that punish prison-
ers briefly for prison infractions. We have a death penalty 
in most states, and L WOP in all. 
At first glance, the underlying logic of life without parole 
seemed plausible enough: "The greater includes the lesser." 
The community's greater power to kill its worst offenders 
necessarily included a lesser, but still awesome, power to 
imprison them for life without possibility of release. 
Life without parole, however, is a very strange sentence 
when you think about it. And the more you do think about 
it, the less stable becomes its moral support. Although it 
may represent the jury's unanimous second choice-of 
those who would condemn the killer to die, and others 
who would leave open a possibility of redemption from a 
life spent inside a prison-today the sentence itself seems 
at once too little or too much. 
If a sadistic or extraordinarily cold, callous killer 
deserves to die, then why not kill him? We ought to keep 
our covenant with the past, steel ourselves against count-
ing all potential future rehabilitation or remorse of the 
most vicious killers. The past cries out and demands it. 
But if we are unwilling to extinguish the personality of 
the condemned and the body that houses it, why should 
we-like Odysseus at the mast-forever place it outside 
of our own power to reassess? Why should we ignore the 
rich, mature, constructive, vital human being that even the 
most heinous killer may become? If we keep the killer 
alive, why strip him of all hope? 
Increasingly, conventional wisdom seems to reject the 
death penalty and substitute LWOP. It seems to me better 
to reject LWOP and refine capital punishment, reserving it 
for only the worst of the worst of the worst. 
So, absent PPS, although LWOP may be the closest 
moral approximation that states without a death penalty 
can reach, although LWOP may often be the only unani-
mous compromise verdict a bitterly divided jury can reach, 
and although LWOP may be the ultimate sanction aboli-
tionists recommend, still, when all is said and done, it 
doesn't feel right. 
True, by one logic, the greater includes the lesser. But 
then, too, sometimes, morally, by doing less than we 
might we do more than we may. 
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